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The EU’s Mediterranean initiatives have their strong and weak 
points. For that reason some recently proposed policy directions are 
worthy of close scrutiny. The first, which however will not be 
analysed at length here, concerns the interface between the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the new Neighbourhood 
Policy as well as the Strategic Partnership with the countries of the 
Middle East which was announced last June. Has the EMP been 
devoured by the Neighbourhood Policy so that in fact we are living 
in the post-EMP stage already? Many are confounded by this 
uncertainty and the EU needs to clarify the position as soon as 
possible in order to ensure greater transparency of goals and 
perhaps improved decisiveness in action. The second issue which 
shall be analysed at more length here is that as a result of modest 
policy achievements in the Mediterranean region, that have often 
been judged to fall short of projected targets, the EU seems to be 
constantly groping for useful conceptual tools that would extricate 
its initiatives from the morass of ineffectiveness. Prescriptions are 
often discarded as quickly as they are prepared. Rather heroically 
last year the Commission was proposing mainstreaming human 
rights in its policies towards the Mediterranean region in an 
aggressive manner. Recent Commission proposals seem to suggest 
that the EU ought to pursue good governance first. Does this entail 
that democratic reforms and main-streaming democracy have taken 
a back seat in the Commission’s approach to the Mediterranean? 
What is the position of the member states? What the Commission 
seems to be suggesting is that the EU should first pursue good 
governance and democracy may or may not follow afterwards.  
 
Last year the European Commission published two communications, 
one in May the other in October, the first dealing with 
democratisation in the Mediterranean region, the second with the 
issue of governance in developing countries. Although the latter is 
not specific to the Mediterranean region the Communication has 
obvious ramifications on the evolution of the EU’s Mediterranean 
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policies.1 The two communications seem to espouse two different 
policy approaches, two distinct paradigms, to political reform in the 
region. The first emphasises the need of radically changing the 
political structure of Mediterranean societies, albeit gradually, to 
help them cross over from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. 
We can label this the ‘high politics’ of democratic transition. The 
second takes a bottom-up approach, claiming that in developing 
countries more emphasis should be placed on governance, which 
by a process of spill over may lead to the attainment of a 
democracy. The strong points of this approach is that it encourages 
the conditions for eventual rapid economic growth while 
dispensing with the messier and more daunting challenges of deep 
political changes as implied by the human rights/democracy 
approach. We can also call this approach the ‘low politics’ of a 
broader democratisation process. It attaches more importance to 
economic and social reform as a catalyst for political change. In 
addition there seems to be some claim on the part of its supporters 
that it dispenses with one important problem that has dogged 
efforts to induce political change from outside: it can be country-
owned and country-driven thus whitewashing the image of 
‘external interference’. In brief the policy issue does not seem to be 
a simple choice between democracy and good governance. In all 
probability the optimal approach to the region is one which 
includes elements of both governance and democracy, perhaps 
something resembling Sylvia Chan’s Asian model which could be 
applied to the peculiar characteristics of the Mediterranean region.2  
This paper seeks to focus on issues just raised particularly on the 
relationship between democracy and governance, seeking to 
establish the extent to which they are different, whether one is prior 
to the other, whether a distinction between the two is necessary for 
the success of the EU’s policies in the Mediterranean region or 
                                                 
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee, on Human Rights in the Mediterranean 
Region [Com (2003) 294 final of 21 May 2003] and on Governance and 
Development [Com (2003) 615 final 20 October 2003] 
2 Chan Sylvia, Liberalism, Democracy and Development, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002. 
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whether such a distinction is possible or whether some other 
paradigm is required.  
 
The question of the relationship between democracy and economic 
reform/development is a very old one with writers often taking very 
diametrically opposed positions. There are those like Samuel 
Huntington, who believe that some cultures are inherently 
incompatible with liberal democracy. There are some who favour 
what Amartya Kumar Sen refers to as the “Lee Hypothesis” which 
claims that ‘disciplinary’ states can better handle economic change 
and achieve substantively higher rates of economic growth than 
democracies. Sen disagrees with this assessment on theoretical and 
practical grounds. Sen’s approach is fully espoused by the Arab 
writers of the UNDP Arab Human Development Reports.3 The EU, 
the USA and many international organisations not least among 
them the UN are explicit in declaring that democracy and economic 
liberalisation go hand in hand.4 The positive causal link between 
economic growth and democracy has meanwhile been challenged 
by Sylvia Chan who claims that the success of some Asian 
economies rests on the fact that they were capable of freeing 
themselves from classical liberal approaches preferring instead a 
particular mix (or matrix) of economic and civil liberties with less 
emphasis on political liberties.  
 
The related issue of ‘external interference’ in the ‘internal affairs’ 
of states is one of the major ones that trouble the EMP. Thus a new 
approach which steers an independent course from the current 
European policies, perhaps a modified Chan model could in all 
probability enjoy more support in the Mediterranean Region if it 
could dispense with the image of interference. It could also be more 
responsive to the region’s unique conditions. This of course will 
have to be tested empirically. Meanwhile, the notion of 
‘interference’ itself needs to be opened up and analysed further. For 
                                                 
3 Arab Human Development Report (2002 and 2003), UNDP, Arab Fund for 
Economic and Social Development. 
4 These issues were covered in Pace R., “Democracy, Economic Development 
and Regional Stability in the Mediterranean Region,” in Xuereb Peter G., Euro-
Med Integration and the Ring of Friends, EDRC, 2003, pages 101-134. 
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the colour of its skin seems to vary depending from which angle 
one looks at it. ‘Interference’ is conveniently invoked by 
governments sensitive to criticism by members of the international 
community for their unsatisfactory democratic and human rights 
record. However, failed policies produce economic and social 
upheavals and produce shockwaves of varying degrees of strength 
and importance in the rest of the world community. In an open and 
interdependent world system such as ours, serious problems of 
poverty and political instability caused by bad policies, worse still 
by failed states, cannot anymore be simply ignored and left to fester 
in some forgotten and isolated corner of the globe because of their 
broader repercussions and the swift manner in which their side 
effects could spread beyond these isolated corners.  
 
In short, in a more open and interdependent world system, political 
instability has comparable transboundary spill over potential and 
negative effects or externalities as environmental pollution. What 
one does in one’s own country is not necessarily solely of concern 
to itself. It is legitimate for states whose welfare can be negatively 
affected by domestic turbulence in their neighbouring states and its 
fallout, to demand that the latter observe standards and norms of 
behaviour in their domestic domains or to co-operate with them in 
containing such turbulence. One cannot lead a peaceful life in a 
condominium unless one can persuade the neighbours to lower the 
volume of their noise. Were states to be completely isolated from 
one another, and leaving aside the vexed issue of the universality of 
rights, then the world could perhaps afford to be indifferent to what 
governments did in their respective national domains. Alas, in a 
more open world characterised by globalisation, in which crime, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, migrants 
and refugees can move more easily across political frontiers and 
threaten the peace and stability of otherwise peaceful societies, 
questions of democracy, human rights, good governance, ethnic 
and minority rights cease to be purely ‘local affairs’ and take on 
more of the properties of “global responsibilities” such as trans-
boundary pollution or pandemics. No amount of ‘cultural diversity’ 
arguments suffice to justify indifference or ‘non interference’ 
particularly when matters threaten the broader global welfare. 
Without having to engage in a discussion on whether rights are 
 250
natural, God-given or universal, at a minimum the respect of 
certain common norms becomes essential. This is what 
international law and international regimes are there for - to help 
states relate peacefully to one another, on the assumption that there 
exists some minimum global community of interests which can 
only be achieved by collective common action.  
 
States have an array of means to encourage unstable states to 
conform, short of compelling them by the use or threat of using 
force. Milda Anna Vachudova analysing the democratisation 
process in Central and Eastern Europe, made reference to “passive 
leverage” i.e. the force of attraction of markets and institutions.5 
The quest to attain membership of the EU encourages states to 
change their political systems and adopt market economies. 
Alternatively states can use coercion through economic sanctions, 
denial of market access or as some would argue (e.g. the Bush 
Administration) the use of “pre-emptive” force. All these policy 
choices are controversial to say the least. What seems certain is that 
a Union of 25 states with a population of 450 million such as what 
the EU has become, has every capacity to practise “passive 
leverage” to advance freedom and stability. 
 
Whatever policy line is followed in the Mediterranean region, it is 
bound to raise a measure of misunderstanding and acrimony. For 
countries on both shores of the sea misunderstanding and the 
problem of lack of communication must be addressed. Roberto 
Aliboni argues in favour of devising a ‘common language’ to 
bridge this divide.6 The European Commission’s recent 
Communications on democracy and good governance must be seen 
as an integral part of this attempt at finding a common language. 
What is lacking is a detailed reaction to this position by the 
southern Mediterranean states which could serve as a first step 
towards achieving a common language. For in constructing this 
                                                 
5 Vachudova Milada Anna, “The Leverage of International Institutions on 
Democratising States: Eastern Europe and the EU”, EUI Working Papers, RSC 
No 2001/33, European University Institute, Florence, 2001. 
6 Roberto Aliboni, “Common Languages on Democracy in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership”, EuroMeSCo Papers, No 31, May 2004 
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common language it goes without saying that both sides must be 
seriously and extensively involved.  
 
But first it is essential to resolve the first issue, namely that in the 
Commission Communications under discussion, as has already 
been pointed out, there seems to be a cleavage between governance 
and democracy which could possibly lead to different but not 
perhaps unconnected policy outcomes. From this point onwards, 
this analysis seeks to identify the relationship between 
‘governance’ and ‘democracy’ and then to go on to explore a 
number of issues related to them and the manner in which 
economic and political reforms could be approached in the EMP. 
 
Good Governance  
  
In the last quarter of 2003, the European Commission published a 
Communication on governance and development.7 The 
Communication is interesting from many angles, however its 
central point is that it contrasts ‘governance’ and ‘good 
governance’ and to the extent possible it attempts to disaggregate 
‘governance’ from democracy. The Commission seems to be 
suggesting a new approach to the challenge of democratisation in 
third countries involving a three stage process moving from 
governance to good governance and then on to the last and final 
stage which would be the achievement of democracy: 
 
STAGE 1 Essentially the aim would be to develop governance 
in a partner country until it reaches the highest stage 
of development which is good governance; 
 
STAGE 2 Further develop good governance until it spills over 
into democracy; 
 
STAGE 3 Strengthen democracy. 
 
                                                 
7  Ibid.,  Governance  and  Development,  Com  (2003)  615  final,  Brussels  
20.10.2003 
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According to the Commission, one of the many attractions of this 
approach is that the governance process would be ‘owned’ by the 
country concerned and that the reforms to be carried out would be 
country-driven. The Communication’s approach as shown here also 
seems to cut short the argument as to which should come first, 
democracy or economic reform. Democracy is the final, cumulative 
stage of development which begins from the initial step of 
attempting to achieve governance. Disaggregating democracy and 
governance is not a completely novel approach and it finds 
resonance in (for example) Dimitris Xenakis and Dimitris 
Chryssochoou who argue that: 
 
“good governance…seen primarily as a flexible policy 
structure, aims at distancing itself from absolute notions of 
democracy and democratisation, focusing instead on a set of 
norms and rules that are associated with what can be taken to 
denote a system of working relations based on the constitutive 
elements of openness and transparency; public accountability; 
lack of corruption; the institutionalisation of civil society; the 
socio-political dimensions and, crucially, sources of 
legitimacy; civic competence (defined as the institutional 
capacity of citizens to be actively engaged in the political 
process); individual and collective liberties; civic entitlements; 
minority and human rights; efficient public-sector 
management; equitable distribution of public resources; 
deliberative political processes; the independence of the 
judiciary; the conception and enactment of well-articulated 
laws, and so on.”8
  
This approach to governance is surely intended to extricate it, as 
the writers emphasise, from the more complex and difficult 
question of political reforms aimed at instituting full-blown liberal 
democracies which are feared and resisted by the political elites in 
the south. This difficulty constitutes a real obstacle in the further 
development of the EMP. Thus while the EU rhetoric (less so in 
                                                 
8 Xenakis Dimitris and Chrysochoou Dimitris, Agora Without Frontiers, Volume 
9, No 4, Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens, March-May 
2004, page 270. 
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practice) maintains that democracy and the market economy must 
progress hand in hand, the southern Mediterranean states may be 
readier to accept a more limited programme of political reform, a 
cocktail of elements from both the democratic process and good 
governance. Such a matrix of selected items would hopefully help 
the southern littoral states achieve good governance possibly with 
or without any further end points in mind.  
  
But when discussing governance and democracy a further difficulty 
arises. Broadly speaking when reference is made to democracy, it is 
the Western-Liberal model based on the market economy, the 
respect for fundamental freedoms, the separation of powers and the 
rule of law that most people, including its most ardent opponents 
have in mind. When it comes to defining governance, the opposite 
is the case. The term has been given so many different meanings by 
governments and international organisations that it would perhaps 
be easier to list its denotations, which are many, than to find a 
measure of consensus on its connotation. Appendix One comprises 
a table of various approaches to measuring and defining 
governance. Some meanings of governance are very loaded. Sylvia 
Chan observes that although international organisations such as the 
World Bank have done their best to avoid declaring openly what 
kind of political regime is desirable to achieve good governance, 
emphasising instead the process by which authority is exercised 
and the capacity of governments to design, formulate and 
implement policy, it is clear that “politically neutral 
recommendations presuppose profound political change and 
represent a political vision. In essence, the concept of ‘good 
governance’ means a state enjoying legitimacy and authority 
derived from a democratic mandate and built on the traditional 
liberal notion of ‘separation of powers’ and the ‘rule of law’, as 
commonly agreed to be the case in Western industrialised 
countries. In other words it is derived from the model of ‘liberal 
democracy’.”9 This has very important implications for designing 
policies and for establishing criteria to measure their progress. 
Besides, ‘governance’ has a dual personality in being both an 
                                                 
9 Ibid., Chan (2002) page 17. 
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objective to be achieved and a criterion for measuring policy 
outcomes.  
  
The Commission defined governance as a basic measure of quality 
and performance of any political/administrative system and went 
on to define it like this: 
 
 “Governance is a key component of policies and reforms for 
poverty-reduction, democratisation and global security. This is 
why institutional capacity-building, particularly in the area of 
good governance and the rule of law is one of the six priority 
areas for EC development policy that is being addressed in the 
framework of EC programmes in developing countries”.  
 
While there is no internationally agreed definition of 
governance, the concept has gained importance and over the 
last ten years…Governance concerns the state’s ability to serve 
the citizens. Such a broad approach allows one conceptually to 
disaggregate governance and other topics such as human 
rights, democracy or corruption. Governance refers to the rules, 
processes, and behaviour by which interests are articulated, 
resources are managed, and power is exercised in society. The 
way public functions are carried out, public resources are 
managed and public regulatory powers are exercised is the 
major issue to be addressed in that context. The real value of 
the concept of governance is that it provides a terminology that 
is more pragmatic than democracy, human rights, etc. In spite 
of its open and broad character, governance is a meaningful 
and practical concept relating to the very basic aspects of the 
functioning of any society and political and social systems. It 
can be described as a basic measure of stability and 
performance of a society. As the concepts of human rights, 
democratisation and democracy, the rule of law, civil society, 
decentralised power sharing, and sound public administration 
gain importance and relevance as a society develops into a 
more sophisticated political system, governance evolves into 
good governance.”10
                                                 
10 Ibid., points 3 and 4 
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The Commission’s definition of governance conforms to its three-
stage scheme outlined above. Curiously the wording seems to place 
corruption outside the realm of governance. In its Communication, 
the Commission also quotes the definition of governance inserted 
in Article 9.3 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement:  
 
“In a context of a political and institutional environment that 
upholds human rights, democratic principles and the rule of 
law, good governance is the transparent and accountable 
management of human, natural, economic and financial 
resources for the purpose of equitable and sustainable 
development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the 
level of public authorities, transparent and accountable 
institutions, the primacy of the rule of law in the management 
of resources and capacity-building for elaborating and 
implementing measures aiming in particular to preventing and 
combating corruption”. 
  
In the Cotonou definition of governance, there is a tacit acceptance 
that good governance does not precede democracy, but democracy 
is what makes good governance possible. At the very least this is a 
controversial assertion with various policy implications and which 
is at variance with the current Commission definition as discussed 
earlier in this paper. Thus even before governance-centred policies 
could emerge there is a great need for clarifying the meaning of 
‘governance’. 
  
Apart from the many different meanings that have been attributed 
to ‘governance’ the term takes on a different aspect when it is 
applied to different levels of decision-making, namely the global, 
regional (i.e. international region), sub-regional, national and sub-
national which may also include sub-national regional and local 
levels. Applied to the EMP, governance is used on the one hand in 
the discussion of the individual polities of the Mediterranean states, 
but it is also significant in a different though not wholly 
unconnected sense in a discussion of the institutional structure of 
the EMP itself.  
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The literature also seems to indicate that the stronger the attempt to 
define governance in a most comprehensive manner so as to 
encompass most if not all of the shades that it has been painted in, 
the more it approaches the definition of democracy. Thus the 
exercise of conceptually separating governance and democracy as a 
‘linguistic’ device in order to avoid the implementation problems 
and obstacles allegedly generated by democracy, becomes a futile 
one when governance becomes more than just a simple set of 
criteria to guide economic and social reforms and begins to demand 
deeper and broader political reforms for its sustenance, if not a root 
and branch overhaul of the political system. In addition, can good 
governance be sustained in the longer term without 
democratisation? The evidence from the Mediterranean region 
seems to show that authoritarianism, corruption, clientalism, the 
rentier economy and excessive bureaucracy are mutually 
reinforcing. For example, how can Mediterranean societies 
overcome the drawbacks just mentioned without the essential 
elements of a democracy? How can institutions whose arbitrariness 
is not open to public scrutiny and control eradicate the worst side 
effects of authoritarianism, i.e. bad governance? The invocation of 
the ‘Asian model’ has obvious relevance when answering this 
question.  
  
A quick survey of the Mediterranean region shows that the 
economic growth experience of the democratic countries is much 
better than that of those which are still in the grips of 
authoritarianism. But this may also be no more than circumstantial 
evidence. This relative success could be explained by the fact that 
the northern littoral states entered the phase of economic 
liberalisation before the southern shore ones, which plodded on 
with their outdated, often state-centric, economic policies well into 
the 1990s. Thus the critically determining factor which led the 
southern shore countries to fall behind could owe more to the 
wrong economic policy choices than to their kind of political 
regime. In other words it may be argued that if the economic 
philosophy is changed it is just possible to attain brisk economic 
growth without the immediate need, though it may nevertheless 
happen later as a result, of changing the political system. The case 
of Egypt’s liberalisation process started in 1974 undermines this 
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argument. As Richard Pomfret observed, although in that year 
Egypt proclaimed a new ‘open door’ policy to replace import-
substitution, “Foreign investors rushed to take a look at Egypt but 
few decided to stay when they saw how difficult it was to do 
business there.”11 What drove them off? Mostly the same kind of 
problems such as bureaucracy, red-tape, corruption, the lack of 
financial intermediaries, in short those same aspects of bad 
governance and underdeveloped market economy that are blamed 
today for the region’s poor economic performance and its inability 
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in sufficient quantities. It 
seems that political stagnation in the southern Mediterranean states 
has delayed the transition to good governance, which in turn has 
stifled economic growth.  
  
The evidence is even more compelling when the case of Turkey is 
brought in. For a long time Turkey followed an import-substitution 
economic policy. Political turbulence in the seventies led to the 
intervention of the military in 1980 and political stability was soon 
established. The 1980 intervention also led to a change in policy in 
Turkey from one of protectionism and import-substitution to one of 
more openness. But this new policy thrust still fell short of 
achieving the right macroeconomic fundamentals (inflation and 
public spending to mention two) and these combined with 
corruption and red-tape continued increasing unabated. Then crisis 
struck: towards the end of 2000 and the first few months of 2001, 
Turkey came close to economic collapse. High inflation, a growing 
public debt, a runaway public deficit and extreme resistance to 
getting on with economic reforms depressed business confidence, 
instigating a run on Turkish banks. In the light of this crisis, a 
strong restructuring programme was put in place with the help of 
the IMF and the Turkish Lira was floated. Three years later, growth 
averages 6-7 per cent per year, inflation has come down to single 
digits, expectations about inflation are good, i.e. that it is being 
tamed, and all the main macroeconomic indicators except the 
crucially important public debt figure are looking healthy.12 
                                                 
11 Pomfret Richard, Diverse Paths of Economic Development, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992, page 80. 
12 See IMF Survey, Volume 33, No 17, 20.09.2004 
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Turkey’s case shows that a cocktail of political instability, wrong 
macroeconomic policies and bad governance are disastrous. 
Further, that half-baked solutions comprising a restoration of 
political stability and more open economic policies which do not 
however give sufficient attention to crucial economic policies such 
as controlling inflation and public spending while ignoring the need 
of good governance may also lead to a dead end. What seems to 
work is a formula comprising the maintenance of political stability, 
sound and far-reaching economic policies that leave no crucial 
element out and good governance. 
  
Contrasting the case of Turkey with that of Egypt (the two most 
populous Mediterranean states) we can draw a number of 
conclusions: authoritarianism or centralised political control is no 
guarantee of success unless it is enlightened as to where it wants to 
arrive at. Authoritarianism with no clear macro-economic policies 
(pre-200/01 Turkey) is as bad as authoritarianism with some 
worthy economic policies but without good governance. Extending 
this analysis to the broader Mediterranean region we find that all of 
the countries of the southern Mediterranean are under some form of 
authoritarian regime, though the intensity of this authoritarianism 
differs a lot across the group. All suffer from a huge deficit in good 
governance. Their economic performance also varies: some have 
performed badly mostly due to internal political upheavals 
(Algeria, Lebanon), some suffered as a result of international 
embargoes (Libya) while others have done relatively well due to 
more open economic policies. Nearly all of them have pursued 
state-centric economic policies for a long time. All have suffered 
from adverse geo-political developments such as the war in Iraq. In 
general it can be said that where modest economic growth was 
achieved it was however swamped by their growing populations 
leading to no real improvements in GNP per capita. It is then very 
difficult to nail the cause or causes of the region’s economic 
problems to a single factor. The evidence is that those countries 
that have relatively-speaking advanced most on the road to 
economic reform (Turkey, Israel and Tunisia) seem to have 
performed better. Indeed, what has been repeatedly stressed by 
major aid donors over the years is the need of improving good 
governance and overcoming the enormous resistance to change. 
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The 2004 World Bank Strategy Paper for the MENA Region 
summarises the problems thus:13  
 
1. The region is politically sensitive: Geo-political 
considerations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in 
Iraq, a process of political transition in the face of strong 
vested interest groups, religious extremism, and volatility 
which creates enormous uncertainty all increase the degree 
of political sensitivity in the region. This sensitive political 
environment leads to prudence on the part of the leaders in 
adopting new policies with long-term benefits but 
immediate social costs.  
. 
2. The region is slow and lagging in reforms: Countries are 
slow to move on structural reforms and for decades have 
performed well below their potential. Oil and strategic rents 
have enabled many countries to postpone reforms while 
putting in place social and employment policies that are 
proving increasingly unsustainable. Serious governance 
issues in both the public and corporate sectors are not being 
adequately addressed. MENA policies are ill-suited to the 
global economy. The region has not featured in the upsurge 
of private capital to developing countries. Distortions 
continue to thwart competitiveness. Savings rates are below 
those in comparator countries. In the absence of successful 
non-oil trade diversification, it will be very difficult for 
MENA countries to find alternative sources of sustained 
growth as neither oil, nor aid, nor workers’ remittances are 
likely to be sufficient to generate adequate employment and 
incomes in years to come. That is why one of the key pillars 
of our strategy is to assist governments to build a business 
climate conducive to investment, jobs and sustainable 
growth. 
                                                 
13 World Bank: Middle East and North Africa Region, Strategy Paper (Updated 
June 2004) 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/mena.nsf/Attachments/MNA+Strategy/$File/
MNA+Strategy+2004.pdf (21.10.2004) 
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Furthering the Quest for a Common Language 
 
Another approach to the question of political reforms in the 
Mediterranean Region favours a more parsimonious and top-
bottom approach urging radical democratic and economic changes 
in order to usher in the liberal economic-democratic state. This 
approach gained popularity, not least with the EU, following the 
fall of communism and in the light of the convulsions that shook 
Central and Eastern Europe afterwards. In the heady days following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall many were ever so ready to graft the 
European experience on to other regions, despite the markedly 
different conditions.14 Fortunately since then European policies are 
more down to earth. In this case as well, cultural differences and 
experiences, not to mention the need to avoid all semblance of 
‘interference’ have also led to the promotion of the need of 
constructing a common language of democracy or of bridging the 
gap between the many discourses on democracy if any headway is 
to be made towards the establishment of mutually acceptable 
criteria, not only to assess progress - or regression - in the 
democratisation process but also to map out a clearer course of 
action for the future. It was partly as a reaction to this approach that 
other courses of action have been proposed such as the one 
beginning with governance as discussed in the previous section. 
 
The insistence by the EU, and the Western democracies, on the 
need of political reforms to strengthen democracy and the respect 
of fundamental freedoms in their partner countries in the 
developing world, is often interpreted, not least in the 
Mediterranean region, as an interference in the internal affairs of 
states which goes against the principle of state sovereignty. This 
reaction is a symptom of the cleavage that exists between the 
claims to ‘universality’ of Western, liberal values and those of 
cultural relativism. According to R.J. Vincent the debate between 
universality and cultural relativism has been going on in the history 
                                                 
14 For example in 1990 Spain and Italy proposed the convocation of a 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) in order 
to repeat the ‘success’ of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) in the Mediterranean Region. 
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of Western political thought for around two centuries.15 One of the 
many claims of the cultural relativity argument is that the moral 
claims deriving from outside a culture have no validity within it. 
This amounts to asserting that a society is effectively withdrawn 
from the moral scrutiny of others. Vincent poses the question: 
“should the rest of the world have no say about a society in which 
the rulers practice slavery or starve their people?”16 The acceptance 
of a minimum set of ‘universal’ rights cannot thus be altogether 
avoided. Also, as argued earlier, in the global society, it is arguable 
how much and to what extent that which happens locally is purely 
local. 
 
In the universality versus cultural relativity debate there seems to 
be an underlying motif that what is developed in one cultural 
domain cannot be universalised or applied in other domains - which 
is not true. It is like saying that if freedom from torture emerged as 
a value in Western societies then its application in other socio-
cultural contexts is not necessary, worse that a culture could 
actually sanction the torture of humans as one of its basic values 
(moral relativism). There is also evidence that cultures and 
civilisations borrow from one another in their evolution. 
 
The alleged incompatibility of democracy with Muslim societies 
(the cultural relativity argument) comes from three main angles: 
from ruling elites in the Arab world, from their religious 
fundamentalist opponents and from some Western Liberal thinkers 
who argue like Samuel Huntington does that “Islamic culture 
explains in large part the failure of democracy to emerge in much 
of the Muslim World” 17  or like Francis Fukuyama who holds that 
although Islam poses a threat to liberal practices in the Arab World, 
in the longer term the Islamic World would seem more vulnerable 
to liberalism.18 Fukuyama’s views, if correct (depending of course 
                                                 
15 Vincent R. J., Human Rights and International Relations, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
16 Ibid. page 55. 
17 Huntington Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order, Touchstone Books 1998, page 29. 
18 Fukuyama Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin Books, 
1992, pages 45-46 
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on what he means by “vulnerability”), would also justify a sceptical 
attitude by Islam towards liberalism. The views expressed by 
Huntington and Fukuyama are consistent with those of the 
‘Orientalist’ school which holds that democracy is alien to Muslim 
culture. But Orientalism consists of many strands, one of which is 
culturally deterministic maintaining that democracy and Islam are 
incompatible for inherently cultural reasons, while the other is 
historic, attributing the lack of democracy in the Muslim world to 
historic reasons, which are contingent. In opposition to the 
Orientalists stand the neo-Thirdworldists who focus on the 
elements of democracy permeating Islamic political systems which 
have the potential of developing further if encouraged to do so or if 
conditions turn in their favour.19 The views expounded by 
Huntington, Fukuyama and the Orientalists are also contested and 
contrasted by some Islamic scholars such as Khaled Abou El Fadl 
who argues that in sharp contrast to the authoritarianism which is 
rampant in most Moslem states, a constitutional democracy 
protecting individual rights is the most suitable polity to help 
Moslems attain Islamic values as enshrined in the Koran and the 
Shari’a.20 This kind of reconciliation of liberalism with the Koran 
has the advantage of maintaining the unity of the aims (as seen 
from a western perspective) of ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ law which 
is the main characteristic of Muslim culture and society. 
 
The first strand of Islamic thinkers, those who harp on the 
incompatibility of Islam and democratic/liberal values, argues that 
because of its claims to universality, liberalism is not only 
intolerant of local, indigenous values and cultures but it also 
subdues Islamic values. Thus the ‘universality’ of the principles of 
democracy and of fundamental freedoms is attacked and labelled 
“Western”. The “West” is accused of trying to impose its values 
upon the weaker developing world. This criticism has a special 
appeal among extremist religious-inspired Islamic movements 
                                                 
19 Aliboni, pp 11-12. 
20 El Fadl Khaled Abou (edited by Joshua Cohen and Deborah Chasman), Islam 
and the Challenge of Democracy, A Boston Review Book, Princeton University 
Press, 2004 
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opposing their governments in the Arab World as well as among 
the elites resisting political reform for whatever reason. Political 
elites claim that democracy would deliver power to religious 
fundamentalists and that this would represent a definite step 
backwards in the ‘modernisation’ of Arab societies. Those who 
oppose the elites propose an “Islamic” alternative. Hence, 
“modernizers” and “fundamentalists” find common ground in their 
opposition to liberalism which both perceive as a threat to their 
power base: the ruling elites because they have to relinquish power 
and subject it to a demos, the religious fundamentalist movements 
because they lose their dogmatic monopoly which gives them 
power over people, which could in turn help them attain power. In 
short, as the purportedly Arab proverb goes when confronting 
liberalism “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”.  
 
Aliboni identifies a third but radically different strand of opposition 
to external interference arising from liberal elements, religious or 
otherwise, nestled in the Arab World itself and who are committed 
to developing their own ‘home-grown democracy’ and who for that 
very reason believe that external influences obstruct their efforts.21 
Aliboni proposes two key challenges for EU (and I suppose) 
Western approaches in the democratisation endeavour: one is to 
reduce if not eliminate the perception of “interference” or intrusion 
in internal affairs; the other is to seek to end the collusion between 
“moderates seeking authenticity and governments seeking only to 
survive” in other words to divide the opposition to liberalism. The 
problem with this second approach is to find enough entry points in 
societies in democratic transition to allow the EU to influence the 
process. This is difficult to achieve since the development and role 
of civil society still lags somewhat behind in the Arab countries 
when compared to the EU. 
 
The search for a common language of democracy obviously 
involves a normative discussion of the universality (or otherwise) 
of democratic values and their compatibility with Islam, some 
                                                 
21A short discussion paper entitled “New Political Approaches to Democracy 
Promotion” discussed at a EuroMeSCo  seminar for Senior Officials of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership organised in Malahide, Dublin, June 1st 2004. 
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allusions to which have been made above, and which the 
‘governance’ approach tries to avoid. A ‘normative’ discussion is 
not useless and it helps sharpen the debate and strengthen the case 
of groups in Muslim societies who base their political programmes 
on the notion that there is compatibility between a constitutionally 
based liberalism and Islam. However, in the context of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) it is important to maintain our 
focus on a number of other important issues that are often lost sight 
of in the heat of the normative versus positivist debate. Firstly, the 
EMP partners have accepted the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights and most subsequent international declarations on 
democracy and human rights which place special obligations on 
them. In addition, when the EMP itself was launched in Barcelona 
in 1995, all parties agreed to “respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and guarantee the legitimate exercise of 
such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, 
freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion both individually and together 
with other members of the same group, without any discrimination 
on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex.”22  
 
This is a quasi-contractual obligation to respect such rights if not 
for the fact that the Declaration is not a treaty. Moreover (and this 
is where the contractual obligation lies) in line with this aim, the 
so-called ‘human rights and democracy’ clauses were inserted in 
the bilateral free trade accords concluded by the EU with each of its 
Mediterranean Partners. Furthermore, the inclusion of these clauses 
in the bilateral agreements with the EU’s partners demonstrated 
amply enough that the spirit of Barcelona required that progress in 
the political and economic field as well as in the third basket were 
to be linked. The EU’s reluctance to enforce more compliance with 
this requirement for many years and the partners’ careful selection 
of what to go along with and what not to accept are enough to 
highlight one of the many glaring deficits of the Partnership but can 
never cover up or excuse failure to act on an international 
commitment.  The lesson for the EU out of all this is that in future 
it should either restrict itself to what is doable or to ensure that 
                                                 
22 Barcelona Declaration page 137 
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international commitments are kept. Otherwise it would be difficult 
to prevent a complete descent into universal scepticism when 
confronted with Mediterranean affairs. 
 
However, more important than these considerations is the fact that 
the universality of democratic rights and fundamental freedoms has 
been accepted by human rights activists in the Arab world itself. In 
this context, while keeping in mind the sharp differences in outlook 
between the educated elites who espouse such views and the 
popular masses, it is important to take note of initiatives such as the 
landmark Casablanca Declaration, adopted by the Arab Human 
Rights Movement at its First International Conference which met 
between the 23–25 April 1999. The Declaration clearly rejects: 
 
1. The manipulation by some Arab governments of patriotic 
sentiments and the principle of sovereignty so as to avoid 
complying with international human rights standards. 
 
2. The use of civilisational or religious specificity to contest 
the universality of human rights. (A denial of the 
Huntington-Fukuyama thesis and Islamist arguments 
rejecting democracy for its alleged inherent incompatibility 
with Islam); 
 
On the other hand the Casablanca Declaration accepts and 
emphasises that “Commendable specificity is that which entrenches 
the dignity and equality of citizens, enriches their culture and 
promotes their participation in the administration of public 
affairs.”23 This is much in line with El Fadl. In short, not all the 
opponents of authoritarianism are apprehensive of the universality 
                                                 
23At the invitation of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, and hosted by 
the Moroccan Organization for Human Rights, the First International Conference 
of the Arab Human Rights Movement: Prospects for the Future met in 
Casablanca between the 23 and 25 April 1999 to examine the condition of 
human rights conditions in the Arab world, as well as the responsibilities, tasks 
and prospects of the Arab human rights movement. After extensive discussions, 
the Conference declared that the only source of reference in this respect is 
international human rights law and the United Nations instruments and 
declarations. The Conference also emphasized the universality of human rights. 
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of human rights and democratic principles. It is axiomatic then that 
the EU should do its utmost to seek to create a constructive 
dialogue with those elements in Muslim societies which think in 
like manner. Certainly, it is not in the EU’s interest to lessen or 
dilute its insistence on democratisation at a time when the debate in 
the Arab World seems to be gathering momentum. 
 
Regional Initiatives 
 
The EU is not the only actor in the Mediterranean and Middle 
Eastern Region. Exogenous pressures for Arab reform originate 
also from the USA. In Appendix 2 the main initiatives in the region 
and which exert pressure on the governments of the region are 
listed. These include the EU’s “Strategic Partnership” and the US 
“Middle East Partnership Initiative” as well as the Arab League’s 
renewed interest in the need for democratic reforms. These 
initiatives show how different pressures are not only building 
inside the Arab states themselves but also from outside. Does a 
joint EU-USA effort make sense in view that the two powers 
collaborate jointly in the ‘Quartet’ on Middle East Peace Process 
and are running parallel programmes in the region? American 
intervention in Iraq has accentuated anti-Americanism in the region 
apart from rocking trans-Atlantic relations raising doubts on the 
advisability of a joint effort at least for the foreseeable future. 
Hence it looks as if the EU has no choice but to pursue its policies 
on its own until the clouds over the Middle East begin to clear. 
 
The main challenge which the EU policies face, not least in the 
context of the Mediterranean Region’s reform process, is that of 
maintaining the momentum and of ensuring that governments 
committed to reform stay on the road. The main difficulty with this 
lies primarily in the fact that certain events, as in the case of 9/11, 
may cause reversals in such processes. Apart from this, Political 
elites in the Arab world have in the past been criticised for paying 
lip service to commitments in the field of democratization and 
human rights much to the consternation of reformist elements 
within Arab society. The Arab Human Rights Charter is one such 
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glaring example.24 Originally approved in 1994 and re-endorsed in 
May 2004 by the Arab League, it has so far (August 2004) been 
ratified by only three Arab countries.  To add to the complications, 
Arab governments are being selective as to which parts of the 
Charter they wish to implement. An item which appeared in The 
Jordan Times of May 21st 2004 is perhaps indicative of the overall 
very guarded approach to human rights and democratic principles:  
 
Arab Human Rights Charter Endorsed 
 
AMMAN (Petra) - A Royal Decree issued on Wednesday endorsed 
the Arab Human Rights Charter as established by the Arab League 
and approved by the Council of Ministers last March. The charter 
seeks to reaffirm respect of human rights as basic and sublime in 
nature. It provides for the right of humans to determine their 
destiny, to have control over their wealth and resources, to have the 
right to live in peace and dignity under the umbrella of national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to have the right to resist 
foreign occupation.  
 
In the meantime, while Arab elites argue over the content of the 
Charter, internal and external pressures are building up. Reference 
has already been made in previous publications25 to the Arab 
Human Development Reports written by a group of Arab experts 
which have roundly criticised a number of shortcomings in Arab 
societies which need urgent attention. The situation is succinctly 
captured in a sub-head to a commentator’s article in the electronic 
weekly of the influential Al Ahram, entitled “Whose human 
rights?” written just prior to the Tunis Arab League summit last 
May, which amongst other things re-endorsed the Arab Charter: 
“While Americans promote occupation as a potential vehicle for 
human rights, Arabs stall on enforcing the rights they honour on 
paper.”26 The same writer commented on the many fundamental 
                                                 
24 The text of the Charter can be read in Brownlie Ian and Goodwin-Gill Guy S. 
(eds.) Basic Documents on Human Rights, Oxford  University Press, fourth 
edition, 2002, pp 774 forward. 
25 Ibid Pace R., op.cit. 
26 Al Ahram Weekly on Line, 4-10th March 2004, Issue No 680. 
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differences dividing Arab leaders and which are delaying the 
ratification of the Charter such as the question of more rights for 
women and the abolition of capital punishment. Similarly, 
according to Arabic News of 12  May 2004, the th Speaker of the 
Moroccan House of Representatives (lower parliamentary 
chamber), Abdelouahed Radi, while inaugurating the African 
Parliamentary Union (APU) held in Rabat between 11-12 May 
2004, underlined the urgency of establishing democracy in Africa 
in order to enable the continent to overcome the problems it is 
facing. He was reported to have said that “the dissemination of 
democratic values and practices, the modernization of political 
institutions, as well as the consolidation of the culture of human 
rights and the civil society constitute indeed the main, urgent, and 
basic tasks that need to be undertaken by our peoples”.27
 
This discussion is also pointing towards another element which is 
important: that one must avoid the trap of treating the Arab world 
as a monolith or a homogeneous, monochromatic bloc. Specialists 
are rarely entrapped in this fallacy but popular images frequently 
fall into it, unwittingly sucking in some Western political leaders in 
their vortex. Policy analysis cannot be allowed to be dictated by 
popular images though these have to be taken into account. EU 
policies towards the Mediterranean have always tried to maintain a 
differentiated approach to each partner even when the avowed aim 
of these policies was to achieve a uniform ‘global’ approach, such 
as in the celebrated “Global Mediterranean Policy” of the 1970s. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has allowed a modicum of 
differentiation as well. But the Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Strategic Partnership promise a stronger dose of differentiation, a 
tailor-made approach to every partner while maintaining overall 
coherence. The main challenge is whether the course will be 
maintained or whether substantive parts of the policy and the 
Strategic Partnership will be jettisoned along the way? 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 http://www.arabicnews.com, May 12th, 2004 
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Neighbourhood Policy 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has today become a strange 
animal indeed. At one and the same time it is both autonomous and 
yet part of the overarching EU “Neighbourhood Policy”. It is not 
clear how the two policies interface. In meeting the goals of its 
Neighbourhood Policy the EU does not intend to pursue a common 
approach to all its neighbours nor to countries of the same region. 
The common approach was the nadir of the Global Mediterranean 
Policy of the 1970s and of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
despite the fact that on numerous occasions the EU was forced to 
depart from its self-imposed norm to take account of local 
differences or in order to compromise when negotiations stalled. 
The Commission now favours a “tailor-made approach”.  
According to this approach, the Action Plans will be differentiated 
to reflect the existing state of relations with each country, its needs 
and capacities as well as common interests. They will be put 
forward by the Commission and approved by the respective Co-
operation or Association Councils. This shift in policy stance may 
not be altogether bad. Perhaps, a differentiated approach is in fact 
what is needed to ensure better results for it allows the EU enough 
elbow room to deal with countries in the same region in accordance 
with their different and uneven levels of economic and political 
development. The main limitation of this approach is that the EU 
partners may practice linkage politics by demanding similar 
treatment on the basis of concessions made by the EU in another 
bilateral setting. Thus the real space of manoeuvre available to the 
EU in treating partners “differently” may be less than at first meets 
the eye. One has to allow sufficient time to pass to assess the final 
outcome of this approach. 
 
The Action Plans are based on a commitment to shared values, 
meaning respect for human rights, including minority rights, the 
rule of law, good governance, the promotion of good neighbourly 
relations, and the principles of the market economy and sustainable 
development as well as to certain key foreign policy goals. The 
pace at which the EU develops links with each partner is meant to 
reflect the extent to which these common values are effectively 
shared, in short implemented by the partner. The Action Plans will 
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contain a number of priorities intended to strengthen commitment 
to these values. They also cover a number of other key areas such 
as political dialogue which comprises the fight against terrorism 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as 
measures to resolve regional conflicts. In addition the Plans cover 
economic and social development policy, offering neighbouring 
countries the prospect of a “stake in the EU internal market based 
on legislative and regulatory approximation”, participation in a 
number of EU programmes (education and training, research and 
innovation) and improved interconnection and physical links with 
the EU (e.g. In the fields of energy, transport, environment and 
information society). In trade the EU foresees increased market 
openings in accordance with WTO principles and convergence with 
EU standards. In the field of Justice and Home Affairs close co-
operation is envisaged to include issues such as border 
management, migration, the fight against terrorism, trafficking in 
human beings, drugs and arms, organised crime, money laundering 
and financial and economic crimes. It is very hard to see what 
would motivate partner states which are reluctant to reform to 
actually accept change. The nirvana for those who behave well is a 
new privileged partnership in the form of European 
Neighbourhood Agreements, to replace the present generation of 
bilateral agreements, when Action Plan priorities are met say in 
three to five years time.  The stick with which to punish non-
compliance is not clearly identified.  
 
The Plans are also intended to encourage regional and sub-regional 
co-operation. For the Mediterranean region this implies further 
developing various forms of cross-border co-operation as well as 
the promotion of infrastructural interconnections and networks, in 
particular in the energy sector. The aim is for the Mediterranean 
partners to develop new forms of co-operation with each other. The 
European Commission has started to draw up a series of country 
reports under the auspices of the Neighbourhood Policy. In the case 
of the Mediterranean region, five country reports were published 
last May covering Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. 
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There is nothing wrong with a flexible approach in as much as the 
overall goals to be achieved are not lost sight of. What is required 
together with flexibility is perseverance in order to ensure that the 
initiatives are pursued to a successful conclusion or as close to it as 
possible. This flexible approach also opens the way for the EU to 
focus on a critical group of countries which would carry on their 
reform efforts ahead of the pack and which exercise a locomotive 
role for the other countries of the southern Mediterranean Region. 
 
The Asian Model 
 
Reference has been made in this analysis to the so called Asian 
model discussed by Sylvia Chan.  Chan’s discussion is a variant of 
the “Lee Hypothesis”. She starts the discussion by decomposing 
"liberal democracy" into its three main components (or 
dimensions): economic liberties (capitalism), civil liberties 
(courts/legal system) and political liberties (democracy). She 
argues that defining liberal democracy in this way is better than 
looking at it as a unitary concept. The writer next poses the 
question as to whether the 'liberal’ and 'democratic' parts of 'liberal 
democracy' complement one another or whether there is a trade-off 
between them? From a political angle they are complementary, but 
democracy without limits can also threaten civil liberties. She 
further argues that there is a more conflictual relationship between 
'economic' liberties and democracy. An effective democracy cannot 
do without civil liberties. But some civil liberties can still be 
provided under an authoritarian or undemocratic regime.  
 
To be said to possess the three dimensions of 'liberal democracy' 
outlined here is to say that one is able to exercise them. A poor 
person is not judged to be free if he cannot exercise any or all of 
these freedoms. Thus if and to the extent that they lead to 
destitution, economic, civil and political liberties are in conflict 
with both the liberal and democratic parts of liberal-democracy. 
Thus if economic liberties have negative consequences on 
distribution, they have to be restrained. This counts for political and 
civil liberties as well: although restrictions on these may affect the 
distribution of wealth less than restrictions on economic liberties, 
political liberties may conflict more than civil ones with improving 
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material welfare.28  This discussion, coupled with the decomposition 
of liberal democracy into its three main components, leads the writer 
to observe that the mix of these liberties is different in different 
societies and that “…the mix of liberties at any given time itself 
depends on the particular history, culture and tradition of the 
particular society as well as the more specifically political skills of 
the leaders.”29  
 
Using Asia’s newly industrialising countries and Japan as case 
studies, Chan concludes that  
 
“it may therefore be concluded that a distinctive set of 
institutions embodying a particular mix of liberties, in 
combination with a set of internal and external pressures, 
produced economic development through the achievement of 
‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘information flow’ in the Asian 
countries considered here. The ways in which ‘security’, 
‘stability’ and ‘information and openness’ contribute to 
economic development are in some cases the same in Asia as 
in the West and in some cases not. The important thing is that 
the connection does not depend on their being a ‘liberal 
democratic’ regime but a regime with a different mix, 
manifestation and institutionalisation of ‘economic’, ‘civil’ and 
political liberties.”30
 
In short, the writer argues that the Asian economies have achieved 
success by adopting a particular mix of ‘economic’, ‘civil’ and 
political liberties, which is different from that which is found in 
established liberal democracies - and it seems to work well. 
 
Of course the causal link between the Asian model or ‘mix’ and the 
economic success of the East Asian NICs and Japan is attractive 
but not completely unassailable. What results would have been 
obtained had the mix consisted of full blown democracy and the 
same set of economic liberties? Of course a satisfactory answer to 
                                                 
28 Chan, page 44-56. 
29 Ibid page 55. 
30 Ibid., page 219 
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this question cannot be given. However, it would be relevant to 
observe the performance of these countries as they increase 
democratic freedoms (freer media, political contestation and 
competition as is happening in Taiwan and South Korea).The link 
between these countries’ culture, work ethic and practices and other 
sociological factors and economic growth need to be explored 
further in order to establish which factors really explain their 
success. As Amartya Sen observes: “The economic policies and 
circumstances that led to the economic success of East Asian 
economies are by now reasonably understood…There is nothing 
whatsoever to indicate that any of these policies is inconsistent with 
greater democracy and actually had to be sustained by the elements 
of authoritarianism that happened to be present in South Korea or 
Singapore or China.”31
 
Democratisation or Good Governance? 
 
It is difficult to judge which of the two approaches discussed here, 
good governance or democracy should be accorded precedence or 
which will translate into more stability in the Mediterranean region. 
EU rhetoric is still targeted on the need to achieve democracy. The 
Commission appears to be proposing a “governance > good-
governance > democracy” approach as discussed in the first 
section of this paper. The advantage of this approach is that it is 
flexible, allows for short to medium-term goals to be targeted, 
leading eventually to a situation where the longer-term goals could 
begin to be focused on. However, this Commission approach 
maintains democracy as the ultimate step to be achieved – though 
there is no predicting where the three-stage process will stop in 
each of the Mediterranean partners once it has been initiated. Much 
will depend on local conditions, the regional context at the time and 
the political will to see the reforms through. All of these are 
contingent factors. The other strong point of this approach is that a 
different menu could be established for each of the partner 
countries. 
 
                                                 
31 Sen Amartya, Development as Freedom, Oxford, 1999, page 150. 
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The difficulty with the governance approach is that what is meant 
by ‘governance’ has to be closely defined since governance means 
so many different things to different people, governments and 
international institutions and each meaning has different policy 
implications. It is also doubtful whether good governance is 
sustainable in the medium-term, let alone in the longer-term, 
without a democratic infrastructure. It can be argued that a measure 
of authoritarianism could be useful in ensuring good governance. 
The argument that a benevolent authoritarian government could 
possibly provide enough safeguards to maintain governance is 
plausible and seems to be rendered plausible by the ‘Asian model’ 
expounded by Sylvia Chan. But the evidence from the 
Mediterranean region seems to show that authoritarianism has 
shielded corruption, inertia, crony capitalism, red tape and others 
element of bad governance that have obstructed economic forces 
from playing their role. Hence a legitimate question to ask is: can 
good governance be maintained within a society that does not have 
the separation of powers, the rule of law, and political leaders who 
are liable to be sanctioned by the people in  free elections? How 
long will it take for good governance to degenerate into bad 
governance again without a system of checks and balances 
provided by democracy? 
 
The other problem with the “Asian Model” is that while sufficient 
time has passed to allow for a better appraisal of the liberal model 
which is still with us, not so much time has lapsed in the case of the 
‘Asian’ approach. And should we speak of the Asian “approach” or 
“approaches”? There are obvious differences of approach across 
the continent. 
 
The analysis in this chapter applied to the situation in the 
Mediterranean region seems to point to the following policy aims: 
 
1. The desegregation of ‘governance’ and ‘democracy’ is 
useful but only to a limited extent. Both concepts form part 
of a single continuum. One can envisage good governance 
in an authoritarian system but it is more likely to break 
down in that case, as a result of the absence of checks and 
balances, than it is likely to do in a full-fledged democracy. 
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2. There is nothing wrong in adopting a gradual approach to 
political reform in the Mediterranean, beginning first by 
focusing on good governance. This would entail combating 
excessive bureaucracy, corruption, rentier practices, red 
tape and clientalism. This process can be strengthened by 
the introduction of civic and political rights. The ultimate 
aim should be the achievement of democracy because it is 
the only way of ensuring that there will not be a relapse into 
misgovernance. 
 
3. There are then what we may refer to as pragmatic 
considerations. Firstly, if there is an ‘internal’ awakening in 
the Arab world in favour of the need of achieving political 
reform in a democratic direction as exemplified by public 
statements made by the Arab League last May, it is not in 
Europe’s interest to throw cold water on it by lowering its 
targets.  
 
4. The EU is not acting alone in the region. Indeed, apart from 
the internal pressures being felt internally in the 
Mediterranean states, there are other major initiatives in the 
region such as the USA’s Greater Middle East initiative that 
are exercising pressure for reform. These too must be 
carefully considered in the EU’s strategy - without 
necessarily associating with them.  
 
5. Achieving good governance is important in the Arab states 
but it will not eliminate the EU’s image of ‘intrusion’. What 
it does is that it limits this ‘intrusion’ to levels of ‘low 
politics’ that are less visible to the Arab publics and for this 
reason more acceptable to them and the ruling elites alike 
than more profound political reforms are.  
 
6. Good governance is probably untenable in the long-term 
without democracy. It can never be an end in itself and thus 
it can never put to an end once and for all one of the main 
bones of contention in the EMP - namely democracy or 
‘good governance’.  
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7. It is rather too much to hope for that the transition from 
good governance to democracy will happen automatically 
and naturally as in a spillover process. It will have to be 
helped along by the EU assisting those elements in Arab 
societies which are supportive of democracy and by the 
appropriate economic and financial concessions for those 
governments who proceed with reforms. But in trade and 
economic matters the EU has tended to be protectionist, 
particularly in agriculture, rather than proactively using 
concessions as a bargaining chip to encourage bolder 
political and economic reform. “Passive leverage” has to be 
intensified by the EU. 
 
8. Policies that pursue different economic, political and 
‘governance’ goals concurrently and which are tailor-made 
to the individual countries of the EMP each in accordance 
with its experience, the level of development, and its unique 
conditions might be more effective because they allow for 
the mutually re-inforcing elements of democracy and 
governance to develop side by side and sustain each other. 
This approach probably also facilitates the transition to 
democracy. The broad strategy taken in the EU’s Strategic 
Partnership seems to fit this need. However, a close watch 
will have to be kept in future with respect to the balance 
kept between the goals (political/economic), the EU’s 
commitment towards ensuring the success of the policy and 
whether there will be some back-tracking on the part of the 
Partners.  
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Appendix 1 
 
The data included in this Appendix is published by the Public 
Sector Governance Group of the World Bank. This brings 
together officials of the Bank working on lending and non-lending 
activities relating to core public sector reform, including civil 
service reform, public expenditures, tax policy and administration, 
decentralization/intergovernmental fiscal relations, and generic 
issues in public service delivery. It can be accessed at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/about.htm The contents is 
indicative of the multi-varied forms of indicators and their 
reliability which are employed in promoting and measuring good 
governance. The Table is being included just as a demonstration of 
the many varied methodologies in which ‘governance’ is employed 
and what kind of data the different users are analyzing.  
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Financial 
Management 
Med  Experts 
(many)  
High Low  No  None  
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Efficiency of 
Revenue 
Mobilization 
Efficiency of 
Public 
Expenditures 
Transparency, 
Accountability 
and Corruption 
KKZ  
(Kaufmann, 
Kraay and  
Zoido-
Lobaton) 
Paper for the 
World Bank 
 
Graft Rule of 
Law Voice and 
Accountability 
Political 
Instability and 
Violence 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Burden 
Low  Aggregation High Low  No  Low  
TI  
(Transparency 
International)  
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
Low  Aggregation Med  Low  No  Med  
Freedom  
House  
Political 
Freedoms 
Civil Liberties 
Low  Experts 
(few)  
High High No  High  
International 
Country Risk  
Guide (ICRG)  
Corruption in 
Government 
Law and Order 
Tradition 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
Low  Experts 
(few)  
High High Yes  High  
BERI  
(Business 
Environmental 
Risk 
Intelligence)  
Bureaucratic 
Delays Contract 
Enforceability 
Nationalization 
Risk Policy 
Stability 
Low  Experts 
(many)  
Low  High Yes  Med  
Heritage 
Foundation  
Property Rights
Black Market 
Regulation 
Low  Experts 
(few)  
High Low  No  Low  
GCR (Global 
Competitiveness 
Report  
Civil service 
Independence 
from Politics 
Competence of 
Public Sector 
Med  Business 
Survey  
Low  Low  No  Low  
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Personnel 
Tax Evasion 
Effectiveness of 
Police Force 
WCY (World 
Competitiveness 
Yearbook)  
Bribing and 
Corruption 
Tax Evasion 
Public Service 
Exposed to 
Political 
Interference 
Personal Security 
and Private 
Property 
Med  Business 
Survey  
Low  Low  No  Low 
  
CIM 
(Contract-
intensive  
Money)  
Contract 
Enforcement and 
Property Rights  
Med  Objective  High High No  Low  
Policy  
Volatility 
Data 
[xls 162 K]  
Policy 
Credibility and 
Fiscal 
Management  
High Objective  Med  Med  No  None  
Telephone  
Delays  
Quality of 
Government 
Service Delivery 
Med  Objective  High Med  No  Low  
 
Appendix Two 
 
Recent Initiatives on Strengthening 
The Democratisation Process in the Arab World 
 
On the 23rd of May 2004, the 16th Arab League Summit 
convened in Tunis approved a Declaration which included the 
following: 
 
“2.3 Endeavour, in light of the document on the reform and 
modernisation process of the Arab World, to carry on reform in our 
countries, to keep pace with accelerated world changes through the 
consolidation of democratic practice, the broadening of 
participation in political and public life and the reinforcement of 
the role of all components of civil society, including the non-
governmental organisations in conceiving the guidelines of the 
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society of tomorrow. Endeavour also to widen women’s 
participation in the political, economic, social, cultural and 
educational fields, reinforce their rights and their position in society 
and carry on promoting family and the protection of Arab youth.” 
 
* * * * 
On the 16th of June 2004, the General Affairs Council of the 
European Union approved the report entitle EU Strategic 
Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East. This 
was approved by the EU Heads of Government during the 
European Council which met in Brussels on June 17-18 2004 
under the Irish Presidency. 
 
The EU’s Strategic Partnership (SP) proclaims the EU’s 
readiness to support economic and political reform in the 
Mediterranean region, the Middle East and outer Middle Eastern 
region, sometimes referred to as the “Greater Middle East”, and in 
particular the political reform programme in line with the Arab 
League’s decision taken in Tunis in May. One of the relevant 
principles of action approved by the EU leaders emphasises that 
“successful implementation (of all elements of the strategy) 
requires a long term and coherent engagement with a pragmatic 
approach.” The SP aims to take a differentiated approach to each 
of the partners in order to avoid the pitfalls of ‘one size fits all’ 
approaches. Another principle is that those countries which are 
more consistent in their reforms will benefit more financially and 
economically (carrot). 
 
In the words of the SP “the primary political concerns of the EU 
involve good governance, democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, gender, respect for the rights of minorities, co-operation on 
non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, conflict prevention and 
resolution, and economic development as recognised by the Arab 
League Summit on 23 May 2004.”  
 
On the Political Dialogue on Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 
the SP states that “the EU should adopt the following general 
approaches, taking account also of requests from partners in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East: 
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• To deepen the political dialogue with partners focusing on 
concrete reform issues; 
• To develop systematic support for the rule of law and good 
governance, with emphasis on legal reform and human 
rights with a constructive involvement of national 
authorities; 
• To support electoral processes and judiciary reform; 
• To engage with non-violent political organizations and civil 
society movements at all levels in society with such 
engagement open to all organizations committed to non-
violent and democratic means; 
• Work to implement the recommendations of the relevant 
Commission communication on human rights and 
democracy, as endorsed by the November 2003 Council, 
including through existing bilateral and regional 
programmes and increased focus through the European 
Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights.” 
 
* * * * 
 
The USA’s “Middle East Partnership Initiative”  
(Source: http://mepi.state.gov) 
 
The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was initiated by 
President George Bush to support economic, political, and 
educational reform efforts in the Middle East. The initiative strives 
to link Arab, U.S., and global private sector businesses, non-
governmental organizations, civil society elements, and 
governments together to develop innovative policies and 
programs that support reform in the region. The MEPI is the 
administration's primary diplomatic policy and development 
programmatic tool to support this new U.S. policy.  
 
It is structured in four reform areas: the economic, political, 
educational and women’s pillar. In the economic field the MEPI 
policy and programs support region-wide economic and 
employment growth driven by private sector expansion and 
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entrepreneurship. In the political pillar the MEPI champions an 
expanded public space where democratic voices can be heard in the 
political process, the people have a choice in governance, and there 
is respect for the rule of law. In the education pillar, the policy 
supports education systems that enable all people to acquire the 
knowledge and skills necessary to compete in today's economy and 
improve the quality of their lives. Finally, in the women’s pillar, 
the MEPI works toward economic, political, and educational 
systems where women enjoy full and equal opportunities.  
 
Among the hallmark activities being conducted under the auspices 
of MEPI are the establishment of the Middle East Finance 
Corporation (economic pillar); a Regional Judicial Forum and 
Regional Campaign Schools (political pillar); "Partnership 
Schools" that offer creative, innovative alternatives for quality and 
relevant education for children and serve as models for 
governments as they build schools in the future (education pillar); 
and regional micro-enterprise and business internships for women 
(women's pillar).  
 
To date, the administration has committed $129 million to MEPI 
($29 million in FY 2002 supplemental and $100 million in FY 
2003 supplemental). This MEPI funding is in addition to the 
bilateral economic assistance we provide annually to the Middle 
East.  
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